Technological keys to the attack on Hezbollah that astonish experts | Technology

This Tuesday afternoon the explosion of thousands of pagers It left at least 12 dead and more than 3,000 wounded among the members of the Lebanese group Hezbollah. Telecommunications and technology experts remain astonished and speculate on how this unprecedented action was organized: “It is a barbaric operation,” says David Marugán, a consultant specializing in security and radio communications.

EL PAÍS consulted half a dozen additional experts who preferred not to give their names because the combination of explosives, technology and traditional espionage makes it extremely difficult to have a complete understanding of how this could have happened. But everyone agrees that it is something that has never been seen on this scale, especially because it is becoming simple something so complex.

In addition to the attack with the beepers, 24 hours later they started exploding walkie talkies of alleged members of Hezbollah, which caused nine deaths and 300 injuries. Reuters reported that Hezbollah had purchased the walkie talkies about five months ago, around the same time you were looking for them. It's unclear whether the purchase process and a possible interception could have been similar. Another Reuters journalist south of Beirut He saw Hezbollah members nervously removing batteries from walkie talkies which had not exploded, throwing the pieces into metal drums. This would indicate that there was either walkie talkies that did not explode or were models that were part of other purchases.

1. Why it is unprecedented

Israel's foreign intelligence agency Mossad – also believed to be the driving force behind the operation in this case – has a history of planting explosives in devices such as landlines and cell phones. In 1996, a Hamas commander, Yehie Ayash, died after a cell phone exploded previously manipulated.

In 2010, Iran Discovers Stuxnet Wormwho had managed to destroy a thousand centrifuges from his nuclear project. Although it was never officially acknowledged, the governments of Israel and the United States were behind it. A facility engineer introduced the virus into the plant, which was not connected to the internet, with a. USB key. In this case, they took advantage of vulnerabilities in the software that controlled the devices, but no one had to handle thousands of hardware components., beyond the insertion of USB key.

The multiple attacks in Lebanon combine the two previous ones. Never before has a simultaneous physical attack of this magnitude and against so many aircraft been carried out.

2. How they managed to modify the pagers

This is the key question and here we enter the realm of speculation. You only know that you are looking for them They were models from a Taiwanese company.. Golden Apollo, produced and sold by another Hungarian company called BAC. Israel has not confirmed that it was behind the operation, much less explained how it was carried out. These types of actions often remain shrouded in theory and speculation, never officially confirmed for years.

The hypothesis that it was a heated battery pirate fell immediately: the type of explosion, its force and the simultaneity of the detonations do not fit with the hypothesis of overheating of the battery until it exploded.

The success of the operation therefore depended on the combination of inserting explosives into the pager and modifying its firmware ―the factory-installed software― to be able to generate the explosion. This cannot be done without physical access to the devices. If that is the case, the key is to find out how they gained access to the pagers in order to modify them.

According to the AP agency, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs said Gold Apollo exported more than 40,000 such aircraft between January and August. Customers were mainly European and American countries; has no records of direct exports to Lebanon.

Theories about where this hypothetical and mysterious interception in the supply chain could have taken place are endless. One simple possibility is that Israel purchased other devices, tinkered with them in its facilities by installing explosives and a new firmware with cable and replace them during transport: some boxes for others and that's it. Another possible method is for him to access the goods and make these same changes live, for example on the ship. This is a much riskier operation that requires more accomplices. But if the explosives and the firmware If they were prepared, it would be possible to perform the modification in a matter of minutes, so it is plausible to imagine a group of agents or soldiers doing it in a few hours in a semi-secret location. And without anyone suspecting serious delays or detecting that the devices had been tampered with.

This interception process (also called prohibition) is not so unique or extraordinary. In 2014, it became known that the United States National Security Agency had intercepted routers Cisco to selectively modify them and gain access to their communications. The difference in this case is one of scale and the fact that the goal was to blow them up, not keep them for years to listen in on.

3. Why didn't they get more information from the devices?

If the authors of the modifications have modified the firmware With these devices, they could track a network of Hezbollah members or any other conceivable target. Pagers don't have the same capabilities as a cell phone, but if they're modified, you can make them talk more than normal.

They could also wait for a more obvious conflict to break out to eliminate their rivals. According to some videos, the pagers exploded after receiving a message that could be the activation of the explosive.

Beyond the horrific damage, it is unclear why they exploded when they did. An apparently confirmed hypothesis is that so much research modified were a potential risk. Any failure would have revealed the operation. According to these sources, the aim was to activate the operation just before a military attack.

4. Why Hezbollah used pagers and not cell phones

They wanted to avoid Israel's technological advantage and be able to obtain more information about the militias: where they are, with whom they communicate, and even what they say.

In February, Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah said: “The phone that you have in your hands, in the hands of your women and in the hands of your children, is an agent. It is a deadly agent, not a simple one. “It is a deadly agent that provides precise and accurate information.” The lack of foresight that a much more basic pager could be more deadly is a possible victory for Israel.

Of course, this does not mean that a mobile phone can simply be operated remotely. Again, it would have to be modified beforehand. This is a much more sophisticated device and purchases are usually not made in bulk as in this case.

Beyond this case, Israel maintains intact the feeling that nothing is left outside its technological tentacles and that it is always one step ahead in espionage or murderous actions with a technical component.